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Abstract: Over the last few years, many discussions have centred around the issue of 
interconnection rates and their economic impact on the market. Interconnection charging 
in Europe is still based mainly on the calling party pays (CPP) principle combined with 
element based charging (EBC). Due to the convergence of the classical PSTN/ISDN and 
the IP world to next generation networks (NGN), the different charging principles and 
systems are being reviewed to determine the optimal solution for the future.  
In its working program for the year 2008, the Austrian Regulatory Authority (RTR) 
launched an industry working group on charging principles and systems for wholesale 
services. This paper highlights some of the central issues of the discussions that have 
taken place and contains the authors’ views and conclusions  .1 Further, the paper 
identifies possible charging systems, as well as economic assessment criteria for these 
systems and how the different charging systems may be evaluated with respect to those 
criteria.  
Regarding the usefulness of industry working groups, the work has shown that these lead 
to a higher degree of transparency between regulator and market players as well as a 
better understanding between the market players themselves. The main drawback is that 
working groups are time consuming and that it is almost impossible to agree on 
meaningful outcomes.   
Regarding the assessment of the charging models it was possible to derive a set of 10 
criteria according to which charging systems can be evaluated. There was a rather broad 
consensus on the delineation of charging models as well as the economic criteria. When it 
comes to the results of the evaluation, the discussions brought forward very controversial 
views amongst the participants. No common views could be achieved on which the 
charging model fulfills the defined criteria in the best manner. 
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1 For results of the working group, please see http://www.rtr.at/de/tk/AbrechnungssystemeVL 130     No. 73, 1
st Q. 2009 
   The working group in Austria 
At the end of 2007, an industry working group was established in Austria 
to deal with the current charging regime for wholesale services. The reason 
to establish the working group was to be able to debate long-term 
developments outside regulatory (dispute) procedures. The goal of the 
working group was to work towards a common position or at least a joint 
understanding of the market players regarding potential future charging 
systems and principles.  
Participants of the working groups were the regulatory authority as a host 
as well as the operators, industry organisations (associations) and also 
consultants, and advisors to operators. 2    
The working group started with a meeting on Bill&Keep at the end of 
November 2007. Since then, 13 meetings have been held, the last on the 
28
th January 2009.3 
In the working group, there was a broad consensus on the delineation 
and definition of the charging regimes. Further, outcomes were derived for 
the criteria, which should be used to evaluate the charging regimes. When it 
comes to the evaluation of the charging regimes, though, the working group 
could not agree on the assessment of the charging regimes. Hence, 
regarding the evaluation of the models, this paper primarily represents the 
views of the authors considering the discussions within the working group. 
   Possible charging regimes identified 
More than ten different charging models were identified. Beside the 
current CPP/CPNP regime with LRAIC regulation for termination rates 
currently applied by the authority, the following regimes were included in the 
analysis. 
                       
2  In the course of the project – as a documentation of the discussion was desired – SBR 
Juconomy Consulting supported the RTR as co-authors for the documentation of the 
discussion. 
3 A list of the meetings and the presentations can be found on the homepage of RTR, see 
footnote 1. Also the final report (in German) has been published there. P. PISJAK et al. 131 
Enhancement of the current LRAIC methodology  
Currently in Austria, termination rates are calculated on the basis of Long 
Run Average Incremental Costs (LRAIC) of an efficient operator. The result 
from previous proceedings has been that Telekom Austria in fixed 
termination markets and mobilkom in mobile termination markets have 
represented the efficient operator in the respective markets. Up until the end 
of 2008, according to a decision of the regulator (Telekom-Control-
Kommission; TKK), the former asymmetric mobile termination rates were 
regulated to a reciprocal level by using a glidepath, by which the smaller 
operators’ rates were gradually reduced to the rates of the most efficient 
operators (mobilkom). From 1
st January 2009, the rates should, according to 
this decision, be symmetric.  4 Within the working group, the following 
alternatives to modify respectively to enhance the current regime based on 
CPP/EBC and LRAIC as cost standard were discussed: 
•  LRAIC where the efficient costs are determined for each operator 
based on his individual costs. This would lead to different interconnection 
rates for each operator, based on operator specific parameters including e.g. 
size of the operator, spectrum allocation, network topology, etc. 
•  A unified LRAIC determined for all operators. This could be the LRAIC 
of an average operator or a hypothetically efficient operator.  5 The last 
approach refers to the costs of an operator with a normalized size, e.g. for a 
market of 4 mobile operators, the market size of this hypothetical/theoretical 
operator would be 100% divided by 4 operators equalling 25% and the 
resulting figures in terms of size, traffic etc. would be applied to determine 
the costs. 
•  Changes of the cost accounting standard in the sense that the fixed 
cost accounting standard is applied to mobile termination and vice versa. At 
the time being there are some differences between those standards (e.g. 
where the access network is not considered in the cost accounting model for 
fixed termination it is in the cost accounting model for mobile termination 
rates).    
•  A unified termination rate for fixed and mobile operators based either 
on the fixed or on the mobil termination rate.  
                       
4 The decision was suspended by a Higher Court. TKK is currently working on a new decision 
on mobile termination rates. 
5  The cost of most efficient operator is the approach currently applied in Austria. 132     No. 73, 1
st Q. 2009 
Bill&Keep  
Bill&Keep6 is a charging regime which does not foresee outpayments to 
the operator of the called customer, i.e. no termination rates. This means 
that the network operators have to cover the costs of termination by other 
means than wholesale charges. Variations of Bill&Keep exist, such as e.g. 
COBAK (Central Office Bill&Keep) which foresee interconnection payments 
for transit services. 
Capacity based interconnection pricing 
Capacity Based Charging (CBC) for interconnection is a charging regime 
by which charging takes place according to either ordered or effectively used 
interconnection capacity. Capacity Based Charging can come in two 
different variations: 
•  CBC with pre-booking: In this case the fees are determined according 
to the ordered network capacity. Usually, either the number of dedicated 
links, the number of interconnection links or ports is used as the charging 
unit. The key aspect is that the actual usage does not have an impact on the 
interconnection payments made. Capacity Based Charging in this design 
allows for the largest possible certainty about forecasting and network 
planing but it also implies some degree of risk for the buying operator with 
respect to inefficiency or limitation, e.g. the buying operator has to pay if it 
orders too much capacity. If too little capacity is ordered, it may be difficult to 
get additional capacity at short notice. Retrading of capacity may help to 
reduce such problems.  
•  For CBC without pre-booking, fees are determined on the basis of the 
actually used network capacities for interconnection in a defined period (e.g. 
in peak-time). The charging unit thereby is the transmission capacity 
reguired in the peak time in kbit/s, Mbit/s or Gbit/s correspondingly. This 
design of the charging regime is feasible for services for which the capacity 
requirements are difficult to forecast. The supplier of such a service may 
face some difficulties due to lack of planning.  
                       
6 The request to introduce Bill&Keep by one of the mobile operators in a dispute procedure in 
2007 was one of the motives to initiate the industry working group. P. PISJAK et al. 133 
Volume based charging 
With volume based pricing operators compensate each other not on the 
basis of measured minutes but based on the data volume exchanged. The 
unit which is paid for depends on the granularity of the volumes of data (MB, 
GB, etc.). 
Interconnection prices based on different quality of service 
This charging regime implies that interconnection prices differ according 
to quality parameters, such as e.g. delay, jitter, latency etc. (JAY & 
PLÜCKEBAUM, 2008, p.  13). In voice communications it is, at least 
internationally, a standard to pay different prices for different quality classes 
of transmission. This regime could become even more relevant in the future 
involving a general trend towards multiple service networks with services 
requiring different QoS. This charging system allows differentiated pricing at 
the wholesale level according to the quality offered. 
IP peering 
The term peering describes voluntary, non-regulated interconnection 
relationships between two or more independent IP based networks for the 
mutual hand-over of data traffic. Thereby, it is not required that the data 
traffic exchanged originates from one of those two (inter)connected networks 
directly. It is also possible to exchange data traffic which one of the 
participants has received from third parties (e.g. based on another 
interconnection relationship).  
Peering originates from the interconnection of IP based networks of 
internet service providers. Regarding peering, different interconnection 
scenarios with respect to charging can be mentioned: 
•  Settlementfree Peering: The exchange of data traffic takes place for 
all involved parties without charging of fees for the exchange of traffic. 
•  Paid Peering: At least one of the involved networks enables peering 
only against payment. This regime will be used especially where networks 
with asymmetrical data volumes plan to conduct peering or in a situation 
where one of the parties involved enjoys a kind of dominance on the market 
which allows to charge for data traffic in a peering scenario. 134     No. 73, 1
st Q. 2009 
•  Hybrid models: In these models both paid and settlement free peering 
applies. Thus, settlement free peering is only agreed for the portion of traffic 
which is symmetrical. Asymmetric traffic is then charged for.  
Another type of interworking in the Internet, besides peering, is transit: A 
network uses the transit offered by a third network in order to send and 
receive traffic to/from other networks. Transit arrangements are based on 
service level agreements and they are not free of charge.  
The features of peering are characterized by voluntary arrangements and 
mutual benefit. A regulatory obligation, e.g. a remedy, would counter this 
general idea. As soon as one of the networks involved does not see the 
benefit of peering any longer it will start – depending on the contractual 
situation – the process of depeering. The importance of peering is increasing 
due to the growth of relevance of internet service providers for the exchange 
of traffic. Also due to the parallel existence of IP and telephony "worlds" the 
application of different charging models which are rooted in these different 
network designs (e.g. peering in the IP world vs. CPP in the telephony world) 
have been discussed. 
"Pure LRIC" according to the EU draft recommendation 
This charging regime 7 is based on the EU draft recommendation. One of 
the central points of the new "pure LRIC" approach is the definition of 
"incremental cost". The definition used in the recommendation is based on 
the economic concept of avoidable cost. According to the recommendation 
the service increment "termination" should be the last increment of the cost 
regime and only those costs should be considered which are explicitly 
caused by this service increment (or can be avoided if external termination 
was not provided). Since non-traffic sensitive cost (e.g. non-traffic driven 
coverage cost) should not be considered, the costs of termination come 
close to the economic concept of long run marginal cost.  
Whereas the current LRIC methodology is more or less a fully distributed 
cost approach the concept of "pure LRIC" comes closer to the concept of 
real marginal cost pricing. 
                       
7 Reference is made to the commission’s proposal, see: 
http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/policy/ecomm/library/public_consult/termination_rates/index_en.htm P. PISJAK et al. 135 
The working group also looked at two other charging systems – marginal 
costs and competition in termination markets (see KRUSE, 2006; DE BIJL et 
al., 2007) which are not discussed in detail here. 
   Relevant criteria for assessing  
different charging regimes 
This section discusses which criteria are relevant for assessing and 
analysing the different charging regimes with respect to the goals and aims 
of regulation (maximizing consumer and producer welfare). The criteria were 
developed by the working group and reorganised/restructured and analysed 
in more detail throughout the discussion process. In total, a set of ten criteria 
was investigated and they are largely in conformity with the criteria 
mentioned in the statement of the European Regulators Group in their 
comments on the EU Commission’s draft recommendation on termination 
rates. 8 The criteria being analysed are the following: 
•  Are competition problems solved? "Excessive prices" (e.g. as a result 
of the existence of termination monopolies) and "market foreclosure" were 
defined as the major competition problems.  
•  Are externalities considered? The working group focused on the 
consideration of call externalities and whether the charging models and 
systems take that into account.  
•  Does the charging regime set incentives for efficient investment? 
Such efficient investment can be assumed to exist if the charging regime 
displays the correct signals for investment, when the costs and the risks of 
investments into infrastructure are being covered and when there is 
confidence in the stability of the charging principles for a longer period of 
time.  
                       
8 In June 2008 the EU Commission published a (draft) recommendation for public consultation 
on termination rates which foresees a number of far reaching measures to bring down mobile 
and fixed termination rates. In its response, the group of European Regulators (ERG) discussed 
the criteria for assessing different approaches to termination regulation and mentioned (1) 
allocative efficiency, (2) cost recovery, (3) symmetry, (4) competition, (5) consumer benefits, (6) 
promotion of efficient investment (e.g. productive and dynamic efficiency), (7) consistency 
across number states, and (8) ease of implementation/regulatory burden as important criteria an 
efficient charging regime should fulfill, see: http://erg.ec.europa.eu/doc/publications/ 
consult_term_rates/erg_08_31_rev1_resp_publ_cons_term_rates.pdf. On this matter also see 
for example STEELE, 2008; MARCUS, 2008a. 136     No. 73, 1
st Q. 2009 
•  Does the charging regime set incentives for efficient network usage? 
Sub criteria are whether the charging regime leads to an efficient allocation 
of supply and demand. Further questions were: (1) Are there risks of an 
over- or under-usage of the networks through the charging regime and (2) 
Are the prices covering the costs of network extensions in the long term? 
•  Are there any arbitrage possibilities due to regulation with regard to 
the charging regime? The question can be assessed by looking at three 
specific aspects: (1) Does the regime set incentives for inefficient routing 
(tromboning/refiling)?, (2) Is arbitrage avoided in combination with specific 
technical measures? and finally (3) Would the introduction of the charging 
regime in only a limited number of countries or specific market segments 
lead to arbitrage possibilities?  
•  As a sixth criterion, transaction costs were analysed with regard to the 
implementation of a new charging regime. Thereby, the amount of required 
additional investments due to the introduction of a new charging regime (e.g. 
new billing systems) including depreciation of existing systems were 
regarded. Further, the costs of regulation, the requirement of international 
standardisation in advance of the implementation and the negotiation costs 
were regarded as important aspects of this criterion.  
•  Are there any outcomes on the legal certainty with regard to the 
implementation of the charging regime? Thereby, financial impacts of a court 
decision requiring a roll-back to the current system either before or after the 
introduction of new charging regime was looked at. Also the possibilities to 
retroactively correct payments already undertaken were assessed as 
important because carriers would like to avoid that a court decision with 
retroactive effect on the payments already done would lead to a chaotic 
situation. 
•  Does the introduction of the charging regime cause disruptive effects 
and compatibility problems? Criteria assessed were (1) disruption on the 
retail level, (2) disruption on the wholesale level, (3) compatibility of the 
charging regime with regimes in other parts of the world.  
•  Is the charging regime future proof? This ninth criterion covers five 
aspects: (1) the flexibility with respect to future market developments and 
technological changes, (2) the adaptability of the charging regime in case of 
changes of the market environment, (3) the period for which the charging 
regime can be applicable, (4) the compatibility with next generation networks 
and next generation access, and (5) the consideration of technological 
neutrality. P. PISJAK et al. 137 
The tenth and final criterion was summarized as "ensuring of sustainable 
competition" and provides an integrated assessment of all previous criteria. 
Thereby, the subcriteria looked at here were inter alia, if the charging regime 
ensures efficient market entry, if it avoids hampering of competition between 
fixed and mobile network operators as well as between small and large 
operators, if it ensures an efficient amount of investment and to which extent 
flanking regulatory measures are required. 
   Evaluation of the charging regimes 
In this section the evaluation of the first nine criteria is described as a 
short summary. The tenth criterion is described in the last section because 
this criterion was seen as the outcome of the other nine criteria.  
The working group achieved no consensus between the market 
participants on the results regarding the evaluation of the systems. 
Therefore, the results presented below contain the view of the authors only – 
based on contributions to the discussion.  
Firstly, the alternatives of enhancement of the current LRAIC 
methodology are discussed (see Table 1). 
The second regime evaluated was bill&keep. Regarding the competition 
problems (1
st criterion), the termination monopoly will remain, but as there 
are no tariffs, there are also no price-induced competition problems. Other 
competition problems such as foreclosure or scale- and allocative 
inefficiences will most likely be of no issue (GALLO, 2008). 
Regarding call externalities (2
nd criterion), these are better reflected as in 
the current regime, but it is difficult to say if the allocation of costs between 
caller and called-party is regarded in an optimal way reflecting the 
distribution of the utility a call accrues to the calling and called party (in case 
of two symmetric networks the called party would roughly bear half of the 
costs). 9 
 
                       
9 For call externalities and the allocation of costs of the call between the calling party and the 
called party, please refer to GALLO, 2008. 138     No. 73, 1
st Q. 2009 
Table 1 
Criterion  Alternatives to the current regime 
1. Are competition problems 
solved? 
As all alternatives are based on the CPP principle, the monopoly 
problems remains and the risks of foreclosure will remain, too (*). It is 
likely that there are better incentives for efficency when identical LRAIC 
are applied for all operators (especially when the efficiency standard is 
defined by the benchmark of a hypothetical operator) than when there 
are individual LRAIC for different operators. This might reduce 
competition problems as all operators are forced/have an incentive to 
be efficient. 
2. Are externalities 
considered? 
Due to the fact that the CPP regime remains, the call externalities will 
remain, too (GALLO, 2008, pp. 36f). For the alternatives for which not 
all costs are included in the cost standard, the costs are slightly better 
allocated between the caller and the called party than otherwise. This 
applies for the fixed network cost models, because the costs for the 
access part are not included in the interconnection charges. 
3. Does the charging regime 
set incentives for efficient 
investment? 
The evaluation of this criterion was very difficult because wholesale 
prices create different incentives for incumbents and alternative 
operators and for complementary and alternative investments.  
With operator specific LRAIC including all costs, the risks faced by the 
operators are smaller and hence, the incentives for investments are 
greater. 
Due to the fact that the implementation of these alternatives implies 
only smaller changes to the current regime, the implementation would 
not create negative incentives as there would be a perception of 
stability due to the limited degree of change. 
4. Does the charging regime 
set incentives for efficient 
network usage? 
Due to the fact that the cost drivers are more or less replicated by the 
charging regime, the risk of inefficient usage is limited leading to a 
positive evaluation of this criterion.  
5. Are there any arbitrage 
possibilities due to regulation 
with regard to the charging 
regime? 
The alternatives induce problems with arbitrage to a limited extent as 
the cost drivers are more or less replicated by the charging regime. 
Regarding mobile services though, there could be arbitrage possibilities 
as there is a large difference between marginal costs and LRAIC. This 
could lead to significant differences between on-net and off-net tariffs, 
which has been the main reason for introducing SIM Gateways.   
6. Transaction costs with 
regard to the implementation 
of a new charging regime. 
These costs are low as the differences to the current regime are rather 
small (VOGELSANG, 2006, p. 56). The costs of regulation will remain, 
though. On the other hand, the costs of negotiations between the 
operators are reduced as most issues are clarified by regulation. 
7. Are there any outcomes 
on the legal certainty with 
regard to the implementation 
of the charging regime? 
There is a more or less positive evaluation of this criterion because 
even if the courts would prohibit the new charging regime after the 
implementation, a return to the current regime is possible. 
8. Does the introduction of 
the charging regime cause 
disruptive effects and 
compatibility problems? 
One can conclude that the problems with disruption increase the bigger 
the changes to the tariffs are. If, for example, the mobile cost 
accounting model was applied to fixed networks, prices for off-net calls 
to fixed networks would significantly increase.  
9. Is the charging regime 
future proof? 
All systems are based on minute based charging which might become 
obsolete in the future due to the introduction of packet based switching 
(VOGELSANG, 2006, p. 55). On the other hand, these systems are still 
flexible and enable e.g. differentiated pricing according to quality of 
service and premium services. P. PISJAK et al. 139 
The outcomes of bill&keep were assessed as rather negative when it 
comes to the incentives for efficient investments (3
rd criterion). As the actual 
costs are not covered by wholesale tariffs, the operators cannot be sure if 
they are sufficiently compensated for costs and risks. Further, the 
introduction of the regime will have disruptive effects with negative 
consequences for the confidence of the investors. The conclusions 
regarding this criterion were very heterogeneous in the working group, e.g. 
due to the hot-potato-dilemma and the actual relevance of wholesale 
revenues for investment decisions (there was no consensus if there is any 
relevance at all) (GALLO, 2008, p. 42). 
Regarding the efficient network usage, the evaluation was negative, e.g. 
due to the lack of pricing signals on the wholesale level, the hot-potato-
dilemma and the lack of financial compensation for the services 
(VOGELSANG, 2006, pp. 67f). Reasons can be found for a negative 
evaluation of bill&keep according to the fifth criterion ("Are there any 
arbitrage possibilities due to regulation with regard to the charging 
regime?"). There are large arbitrage problems between the markets with 
bill&keep and the markets outside the regime due to the large differences in 
prices between bill&keep and the current CPP/EBC-regime. 
The sixth criterion (transaction costs) scored relatively positively. The 
costs of regulation will be reduced because there is hardly any tariff 
regulation necessary. This does not apply though, if COBAK is introduced, 
because then there will still be wholesale tariffs (transit) which might be 
necessary to regulate. Furthermore the NRA has to decide on the points of 
interconnection for bill&keep. A positive aspect regarding bill&keep is that 
there is no need for investments into new billing systems.  
The seventh criterion (legal uncertainty) can be seen rather neutrally: as 
long as the current billing systems are kept for a while after the introduction 
of bill&keep, the introduction can be rolled-back, with no greater problems.  
For the eighth criterion (disruption) it is difficult to say for sure if and how 
there will be waterbed effects and if these are negative effects for end 
customers and/or operators, e.g. decreasing call tariffs will be viewed 
positively by the end-users; on the other hand it is questionable whether the 
called party would accept a fee for receiving calls.  
A negative aspect of bill&keep is that it is less compatible with other 
systems in other parts of the world. This is due to asymmetric financial 
streams with CPP/EBC-countries.  140     No. 73, 1
st Q. 2009 
The regime is future proof (ninth criterion) because it is flexible and can 
handle different types of traffic (circuit and packet switched networks). 
Questions arose in the discussions of the working group if bill&keep is able 
to cope with the future multi-service environment as there might be problems 
to charge extra for premium services and services with extra high QoS. 
The third regime discussed and evaluated was capacity based ic-pricing. 
As with most other systems, the termination monopoly problem remains with 
this charging regime. Also regarding the second criterion (call externalities), 
the same situation as for the current regime exists. Due to the fact that the 
CPP regime remains, the call externalities will remain, too. 
Regarding the incectives for efficient investments (criterion 3), these were 
not assessed because the impact of this charging model on the investment 
decisions is rather unclear (e.g. what is the impact of wholsale revenues on 
investment decisions?). Many operators in Austria seem to view it positively 
that there is a high correlation between the wholesale price and the actual 
network costs, leading to a situation where costs and risks are considered by 
the charging regime.  10 This in turn, reduces the overall uncertainty for 
investors. Also, the changes due to the implementation of the charging 
regime are relatively small and therefore there is a stability granted to the 
investors, which can be viewed positively. 
The fourth criterion (efficient network usage) was positively evaluated 
because the charging principles are correlating with network costs, which 
means that the pricing is incentivizing efficient network usage 
(VOGELSANG, 2006, p. 60). The correlation between the tariffs and the cost 
drivers, leads to the conclusion that there are only limited arbitrage 
possibilities within the same wholesale market (fifth criterion). However, the 
parallel coexistence with CPP/EBC regimes could probably lead to arbitrage 
possibilities: this is because the buyers of the wholesale offers would 
optimize their usage by using both regimes in parallel with the risk that the 
supplying operators would not cover their total costs. This can (only) be 
solved by regulation (VOGELSANG, 2006, p. 77). 
The conclusions are rather mixed when it comes to the transaction costs 
(sixth criterion). Capacity-based ic-pricing does not require any investments 
in billing systems as the current ones can be used. There is also no need for 
any national or international standardisation. On the other hand, the cost of 
                       
10 This is also identified by VOGELSANG, 2006, p. 60. P. PISJAK et al. 141 
regulation will remain and additionally transaction costs are relevant 
because new contracts have to be negotiated between the operators. 
For the evaluation of the seventh criterion the assessment comprised that 
there could be extensive problems if courts would repeal the decision to 
change the charging regime ex-post, because no accounting data including 
the amount of minutes is required to charge for the capacities. This problem 
can be neutralised, if the old billing systems are used as fall-back solutions 
for the first years after implementation of capacity based ic-pricing. 
It is regarded unlikely that the introduction of capacity based 
interconnection pricing would cause problems related to disruption and 
incompatibility (eighth criterion) to a large extent. This was concluded 
because the underlying charging principle is currently used in the end user 
markets (flatrates) without extensive problems being observed. 
The charging regime is partially future proof (criteria 9), as it can be used 
to some extent for NGN/NGA networks; e.g. by using different PoI it is 
possible to handle different traffic classes with regard to different qualities of 
service. It is not clear though, how the regime would be able to react to 
larger changes in the industry. 
The evaluation of the next regime, volume based charging is to a large 
extent comparable to capacity-based ic-pricing, although there are some 
important differences. The evaluation as interpreted by the authors based on 
the discussions in the working group is shown in the table 2. 
The next regime evaluated was the quality differentiated pricing. 
Regarding the first two criteria, the regime was equally evaluated as the 
current regime (e.g. remaining termination monopoly and call externality 
problems).  
Regarding the incectives for efficient investments (third criterion), no 
clear conclusions can be drawn (see the assessment of capacity base 
interconnection pricing). A positive feature of the third criterion is that there is 
a strong correlation between the charging principles and the network costs, 
leading to a situation where costs and risks are regarded by the charging 
regime. This implies that the overall uncertainty for investors is limited. On 
the negative side, the introduction might create uncertainties and thereby 
harm the investor’s confidence in the stability of the regime - this is because 
outcomes from the charging regime are difficult to assess beforehand. 142     No. 73, 1
st Q. 2009 
Table 2 
Criterion  Volume based pricing 
1. Are competition 
problems solved? 
The regime is no solution to the termination monopoly problems (cnf. 
capacity based ic-pricing)  
2. Are externalities 
considered? 
The conclusion is that there are no significant differences to the current 
systems (refer to capacity based ic-pricing) 
3. Does the charging 
regime set incentives 
for efficient 
investment? 
There were no clear conclusions made concerning incentives for investors. 
Regarding the expected investor confidence in the charging regime, this 
was seen as fulfilled. On the other hand, there is a possibility that investors 
are not compensated for costs and risks, as the correlation between the 
charging units and the network costs is only partially in place: The charging 
regime does not reflect peak traffic but average traffic, while network costs 
are driven by the peak traffic.  
4. Does the char-ging 
regime set incentives 
for efficient network 
usage? 
The incentives for efficient network usage are nonexistent, because the 
correlation between the charging units and the network costs is only 
partially given (see previous criterion). 
5. Are there any 
arbitrage possibili-ties 
due to regu-lation 
with regard to the 
charging regime? 
The same conclusions were made as for capacity based ic-pricing: there 
are limited arbitrage possibilities within the same wholesale market. 
However a parallel coexistence with CPP/EBC regimes could lead to 
arbitrage possibilities, which have to be dealt with by regulation. 
6. Are there 
transaction costs with 
regard to the 
implementation of a 
new charging 
regime? 
The same conclusions were made as for capacity based ic-pricing, i.e. the 
conclusions are rather mixed and there are different views present in the 
Austrian market regarding the evaluation of this criterion. The regime does 
not require any investments in billing systems as the current ones can be 
used. There is also no need for any national or international 
standardisation. On the negative side, the cost of regulation will remain and 
additional transaction costs are implied by negotiation costs for new 
contracts between the operators. 
7. Are there any 
outcomes on the 
legal certainty with 
regard to the 
implementation of the 
charging regime? 
The same conclusions were made as for capacity based ic-pricing: There 
could be extensive problems if courts would repeal the decision to change 
the charging regime.The reason is that there is no accounting data 
including the number of exchanged minutes required to charge for volumes. 
Therefore, the invoices cannot be produced ex-post based on minutes in 
case the courts repeal the decision to introduce volume base charging. This 
problem does not exist though, if today’s billing systems are used as fall-
back solutions for the time after implementation of volume base pricing. 
8. Does the intro-
duction of the char-
ging regime cause 
disruptive effects and 
compatibility 
problems? 
The same conclusions were made as for capacity based ic-pricing: There 
are probably no problems due to the introduction as the underlying 
charging principle is currently used in the end user markets (e.g. the "fair 
use" flatrates). 
9. Is the charging 
regime future proof? 
The same conclusions were made as for capacity based ic-pricing: The 
charging regime is probably future proof as it can be used for NGN/NGA 
networks and it is able to handle different services due to a unified charging 
unit (e.g. KB/sec) However it is questionable whether this charging model 
allows to differentiate prices according to different qualities of service. It is 
not clear though, how the regime would be able to react to larger changes 
in the industry. 
Regarding the fourth criterion (efficient network usage), it was concluded 
that the quality differentiated prices theoretically lead to better steering 
towards efficient usage. In reality though, this is not necessarily true due to a 
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used to regulate prices and the quality actually provided across several 
interconnected networks could be insufficient. Further, it is not clear to what 
extent quality is a significant cost driver, which in turn would mean that 
quality is not suitable to steer the usage of the networks.11 
There was no conclusion regarding the fifth criterion (arbitrage). The 
reason is that there is no evident correlation between arbitrage and quality 
differentiation. A problem identified though, is that a parallel coexistence with 
CPP/EBC regimes would probably lead to arbitrage possibilities, which have 
to be dealt with by regulation (for the same reasons as for capacity based ic-
pricing, see above). 
Regarding the transaction costs (sixth criterion), the charging regime was 
concluded as sub-optimal due to a number of reasons: Investments must be 
made in billing systems and networks, the increased complexity implies 
higher costs of regulation, extensive standardisation is required and further 
costs for negotiation between operators are to be expected. 
Regarding the legal certainty (criterion seven), it was among others 
argued that problems hardly exist because independent of what the courts 
could decide, the roll back of the systems is possible and the necessary 
accounting information for a possible retroactive billing based on CPP/EBC 
is possible too. 
The evaluation of the eighth criterion (disruption and compatibility), was 
rather neutral. Because the tariffs would still be cost oriented, it is likely that 
the changes to the tariffs would be rather limited. Due to the implementation 
of the differentiation of the prices, some prices for "premium" quality might 
rise, though, which could be perceived negatively by the end users. The 
future proof of quality differentiated pricing was evaluated heterogeneously. 
From a theoretical perspective the quality differentiated pricing is highly 
compatible with NGN. However, the flexibility of the regime depends on the 
way the charging regime is implemented. 
The next charging regime, IP-Peering is in several aspects comparable to 
bill&keep. Due to the possibility to implement IP-Peering with Paid Peering 
for situations with asymmetric traffic, the evaluation is in many aspects more 
positive than for bill&keep. 
                       
11 The cost causation has been discussed by JAY & PLÜCKEBAUM., p. 26ff. Depending on 
the assumptions for the cost determination, the cost causation could be rather limited (please 
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Regarding the competition problems (first criterion), the termination 
monopoly will remain as the caller of his operator cannot decide on the 
termination network to be used. In difference to bill&keep but comparable to 
the current regime, there is also a risk of price-induced competition problems 
due to Paid Peering.  
Regarding call externalities, these are better regarded as in the current 
regime, but like the assessment of bill&keep it is difficult to say if there is an 
optimal allocation of costs between caller and called-party, i.e. because it is 
not clear if the called party should bear half of the costs in case of two 
symmetric networks. 
When it comes to the incentives for efficient investments it was 
concluded that the outcomes of IP-Peering are both positive and negative. 
For instance, inefficient market entries are prevented due to the mechanisms 
of Paid Peering. Further, paid peering mechanisms imply that the operators 
are forced to make efficient investments in order to avoid paid peering.  
On the negative side, foreclosure could exist due to too high prices for 
Paid Peering. Another negative aspect is that in the case of Settlement-free 
Peering the actual costs are not covered in the wholesale markets which 
could imply that operators are not sufficiently compensated for costs and 
risks. Further, the introduction of the regime will cause disruptiveness with 
negative consequences for the confidence of the investors. 
Regarding the forth criterion (efficient network usage), the evaluation was 
negative - mostly due to the lack of pricing signals, the hot-potato-dilemma 
as well as the lack of cost causation regarding compensation for the 
wholesale services. These problems are partially solved though due to the 
mechanism of Paid Peering, punishing inefficient routing. 
A rather negative assessment of IP Peering was made according to the 
fifth criterion (Are there any arbitrage possibilities due to regulation with 
regard to the charging regime?). Arbitration problems between the markets 
with IP Peering charging regimes and other markets will probably occur, e.g. 
due to the large differences compared to the current CPP/EBC-regime.  
Regarding transaction costs (sixth criterion) the introduction of IP-Peering 
will not require any investments in billing systems as the current ones will be 
used to implement the Paid Peering functionality. Regarding the costs of 
regulation and negotiations, these will only be slightly reduced compared to 
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implementation of Paid Peering. Hence, the changes to the current regime 
are rather limited concerning the transaction costs. 
The seventh criterion (legal certainty) was evaluated as more or less 
positive even if the courts would prohibit the new charging regime after the 
implementation. This is becasue a return to the current regime is possible as 
the traffic has to be monitored to determine if there is asymmetric traffic to 
be billed according to the principles of Paid Peering.  
Regarding disruptive effects and compatibility (eighth criterion) it was 
concluded that there will be substantial changes to the business models (i.e. 
waterbed effects), but if this would lead to disruptive effects could not be 
concluded, e.g. because it is difficult to assess ex-ante how operators and 
end users would react and the business models would change. Regarding 
compatibility with current systems, this should not be any problem as IP 
Peering does already exist as a charging regime. 
The future proof of IP Peering (criterion nine) seems to be comparable to 
the current regime and to some extent to the volume based charging model. 
Due to Paid Peering, the charging regime has to be adopted in the same 
way as the current regime (see the evaluations of the alternatives to the 
current regime above). 
Pure LRIC was the last charging regime discussed and evaluated. The 
results with regard to this regime are rather mixed. This charging regime will 
partially reduce competition problems (the termination monopoly will remain, 
but due to lower tariffs, the main problems will be less substantial) and it will 
lead to a better consideration of call externalities as the called party and/or 
called party network will cover the fixed network costs. It is questionable 
though if the allocation of costs between caller and called party is optimal. 
Regarding the third criterion (incentives for efficient investments) the 
evaluation was heterogeneous. It is difficult to assess the outcomes on 
incentives to invest, as the lower tariffs which are the outcome from Pure 
LRIC, will benefit some business models and investment while others will 
suffer. It is clear though, that costs and risks will not be covered anymore by 
wholesale charges, which produces negative incentives for investors. 
Regarding the trust in stability of the regime, this will be harmed due to the 
implementation phase (with disruptive effects) but after implementation, the 
stability (and therefore also the confidence of the investors) will be increased 
due to more stable tariffs. 146     No. 73, 1
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Regarding efficient network usage (fourth criterion) the risk of inefficient 
usage is limited, leading to a positive evaluation of this criterion. This is 
because the cost drivers are more or less replicated by the charging regime, 
which reduces the risks of a sub-optimal usage.  
Pure LRIC implies relatively limited possibilities of arbitration (criterion 
five) because the prices are set at marginal costs, which limits the margins 
available for arbitrage caused by on-net/off-net price differentials. On the 
other hand, if the regime is only implemented within one country, the cross-
border price differences will be extensive which might produce arbitrage 
possibilities. 
The transaction costs (criterion six) were evaluated rather 
heterogeneously. On the one hand, the cost of regulation will be high as new 
cost models must be developed and implemented. On the other hand, the 
costs of negotiations between operators will remain low (due to intensive 
regulation) and there is no need for new billing systems. 
Seventh criterion (legal certainty): There is a positive evaluation of this 
criterion because even if the courts would prohibit the new charging regime 
after the implementation, a return to the current regime is possible as only 
the prices will change and not the charging units. 
When it comes to possible disruption, the evaluation is complex as the 
prices will fall (especially for calls to mobile users). On the one hand, this 
might cause waterbed effects as the operators try to compensate the 
revenue losses from the wholesale markets. On the other hand the falling 
wholesale prices will eventually be a benefit for the end-users (i.e for the 
calling party), as long as they do not suffer too much from the waterbed 
effects.12 Hence, disruptive effects might occur, but it is not clear if these will 
be negative or not for the industry and the consumers. A positive aspect of 
Pure LRIC is that the EU Commission wants to implement it EU wide, which 
means that there will hardly be incombatibility problems with a majority of 
other EU countries. 
Regarding the last criterion (future proof), there are no differences 
compared to the current regime as CPP/EBC where per minute charging 
remains.  
                       
12 MARCUS (2008b, p. 29) states in his paper that lower retail tariffs will benefit the end users. P. PISJAK et al. 147 
   Summary of the evaluation 
In this section, the evaluation of the tenth criterion "establishment of 
sustainable competition" is presented. No conclusion is made in favour of or 
against a charging regime though. Instead, as far as possible, the opinions 
expressed during the discussions have been reflected. 
Enhancements of the current LRAIC standard: The variations of these 
alternatives to the existing regulation seem to differ only marginally, 
nevertheless different outcomes exist. Of the alternatives, the criteria are 
fulfilled to a different extent and in different ways, but without any alternative 
being clearly better than the other.  
Bill&Keep and IP-Peering: The implementation of bill&keep implies a lot 
of changes with respect to current charging regimes. The overall impression 
is that bill&keep fulfills some criteria quite well (e.g. competition problems 
and call externalities), but has a tendency to increase the problems with 
regard to other criteria (e.g. efficient investment, efficient use of network 
resources). As a matter of fact, bill&keep imposes new questions on which 
there are no answers or solutions yet. For IP-Peering, these conclusions 
also hold true, but with the positive possibility to deal with imbalances due to 
asymmetric traffic between operators which could have positive effects with 
regard to the criteria efficient investment, efficient use of network resources 
or arbitrage opportunities. 
Capacity-based IC-pricing and volume based charging: These regimes 
are at an average and their evaluation is quite similar. Although, they might 
guarantee an efficient amount of investments and do not require extensive 
flanking regulatory measurements, they might bear a significant risk of 
distortion of competition especially between fixed and mobile network 
operators and – to a lesser extent – between small and big operators. 
Quality differentiated pricing: The evaluation of this regime is comparable 
to capacity-based IC-pricing regime, but it leads to higher transaction costs 
and uncertainties as well as to additional costs in the initial phase. However, 
it was discussed that this regime might meet the future requirements in a 
better way, because quality differentiation is presumably going to play a 
more important role in the future when multiple services with different quality 
requirements will be implemented.  
Pure LRIC: The difficulty of evaluating this regime lies in the the fact that 
the approach is still to be determined in detail. Besides the fact discussed, 148     No. 73, 1
st Q. 2009 
that a lot of efficiency enhancing elements might exist, there is the core 
problem, that the total cost coverage on the wholesale level is not 
safeguarded, which has significant consequences for investment incentives 
as well as the end user tariffs.  
Overall, the analysis shows that today’s wholesale regimes are under 
change and that this affects also the charging regime to a considerable 
extent. Further, a charging regime for wholesale services that is 
economically favourable to all stakeholders is hard to find because the 
industry perspectives on possible solutions are very wide and controversial.  P. PISJAK et al. 149 
References 
DE BIJL P., E. VAN DAMME, G. BRUNEKREEFT, P. LAROUCHE, V. SORANA & 
N. SHELKOPLYAS  (2007):  "Interconnected Networks", TILEC Discussion Paper 
Series 2005-2007. 
GALLO E. (2008): "Is There a Right Charging Principle with the NGN 
Advent", COMMUNICATIONS&STRATEGIES, no. 72, 4
th quarter 2008, pp. 33-49. 
JAY S. & PLÜCKEBAUM T. (2008): "Strategien zur Realisierung von Quality of 
Service in IP-Netzen", WIK Diskussionsbeitrag Nr. 315, December, p. 13. 
KRUSE Jörn (2006): "Mobilterminierung im Wettbewerb", Diskussionspapier Nr. 55, 
Dezember. 
MARCUS J. Scott: 
- (2008a): "How Deployment of NGN is Changing Costing and Charging Principles", 
Presentation Geneva, September 2008. 
- (2008b): "IP-based NGNs and Interconnection: The Debate in Europe", 
COMMUNICATIONS&STRATEGIES, no. 72, 4
th quarter 2008, pp. 17-32. 
STEELE Roger (2008): Wholesale NGN Charging Alternatives, An Examination of 
NGN Price Setting and Cost Analysis, Geneva, September. 
VOGELSANG I. (2006): "Abrechnungssysteme und Zusammenschaltungsregime 
aus ökonomischer Sicht", Boston, 28 April.  
http://www.bundesnetzagentur.de/enid/3e9b01ba45096ac219ca59c80793c0f9,0/Reg
ulierung_Telekommunikation/IP-Zusammenschaltung_1xs.html, p. 56 
 
 